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HIGH HOPES: WHY COURTS SHOULD
FULFILL EXPECTATIONS OF LIFETIME
RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS IN
AMBIGUOUS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
Abstract: Since World War II, employer-provided medical benefits for
retirees have been a common feature of collective bargaining
agreements. Due to dramatic increases in the cost of these benefits over
the last decade, many employers have unilaterally modified or
terminated these benefits, leaving retirees without their expected health
insurance, This Note argues that until Congress acts to resolve this
situation, federal courts must act to protect retirees' benefits. The Note
concludes that because the retirees' expectations of continued benefits
are reasonable in light of the union workplace and such an approach is
consistent with federal labor policy, courts should apply a rebuttable
presumption that such benefits vest once retirees prove the agreement
providing them is ambiguous, and then allow employers to present
evidence that overcomes the presumption.
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Disraeli observed that "[w]hat we anticipate seldom
occurs; what we least expected generally happens."' Although she
lives over a century after Disraeli's statement, Elaine Russell would
probably agree, considering she never expected to rely on a free food
bank after retiring from four decades of work at Sears-Roebuck. 2 Simi-
larly, Richard Mebane is unlikely to argue with this unsettling observa-
tion considering he never expected he would need to stretch his sup-
ply of medicine by skipping prescribed doses. 3 Albert Shaklee would
no doubt concur with the observation because he could never have
1 BENJAMIN DISRAELI, HENRIETTA TEMPLE bk.ii, ch.4 (1837), reprinted in jotiN
BARTLErr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 434 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed., 1992).
2 See Ellen E. Schultz, This Won't Hurt: Companies nansform Retiree-Medical Plans into
Source of Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2000, at Al.
3 Schultz, supra note 2, at Al. Mr. Mebane, however, will take his medicine every day if
he begins to feel light-headed. Id.
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anticipated that he would need to work the midnight shift at a parts-
grinding factory after leaving his accounting career. 4
What these and thousands of other retirees actually expected
were lifetime medical benefits from their former employers during
retirement.5
 Instead, however, many of the nation's employers have
disappointed these expectations through substantial cuts and
modifications to the medical benefits they provide to qualified retir-
ees.6
 While retirees anticipated their years of service to their former
employers would entitle them to permanent medical insurance cover-
age, they suddenly face tremendous medical and financial hardships
they never expected.? Retirees confronted by these new hardships
have sued their former employers, claiming that their benefits could
not be unilaterally modified because the collective bargaining agree-
ments between their employer and their union contractually vested
their benefits. 8
 Unfortunately for both the retirees and their former
employers, Congress and the courts have been unable to arrive at a
clear, uniform solution to this problem. 9
Much of the disagreement is due to the inability of the United
States Courts of Appeals to agree on whether the retirees' disap-
pointed expectations of lifetime benefits are relevant.° While admit-
ting that the retirees' stories are compelling, some courts claim to be
4 Id.
5
 See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the
Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 Onto ST. U. 153, 166 (1995); see also Nathanael
R. Bcrncking, Comment, Don't Mow Over the Yard-Man Inference: Guarding Against Improper
Modification of Welfare Benefits Provided in A Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 Sr. Louts U.
U. 261, 268 (2001); Janilyn S. Brouwer, Symposium Note, Retiree Health Benefits: The Promise
of a Lifetime?, 51 Como Sr. J.L. 985, 999-1000 (1990).
6 Schultz, supra note 2, at Al. These employers include Walt Disney, Campbell Soup,
McDonnell-Douglas, Merck, Procter Gamble and Anheuser-Busch. See id.
7 See id.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1515 (8th Cir. 1988);
United Steelworkers v. Textron, Inc., 8361
 2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1987); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.,
716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983). The term "to vest" means "to render [benefits] forever
unalterable." Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998). Because
this Note focuses on collective bargaining agreements, "vested" further refers to "benefits
that continue beyond the expiration of the agreement creating them." Rossetto v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1191, 1191 (2001).
9
 See Rossetto, 217 F.3d at 543 (characterizing rulings of federal courts as "all over the
lot"); Am. Fed'n of Grain Millers v. Int'l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1997)
(discussing disagreement between courts over how to address claims when contracts are
ambiguous).
10
 Compare Keifer v. H.R. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989), and Yard-Man, 716
F.2d at 1482, with UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 1999), and Ander-
son, 836 F.2d at 1517.
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constrained by legal rules of contract interpretation and require em-
ployers to provide lifetime benefits only if they clearly and expressly
agreed to do so in the collective bargaining agreement. 11 To promote
the understandings memorialized in the agreements, these courts
frequently find that, absent express language unambiguously vesting
retiree benefits, employers are free to modify medical benefit pro-
grams as market conditions change." Thus, extra-contractual em-
ployee expectations are irrelevant to such courts and cannot be used
to aid plaintiffs."
The subject of retirement benefits raises numerous legal issues. 14
While employers provide two types of retirement benefits to workers,
this Note focuses solely on modifications to employer-provided retiree
welfare benefits." Although welfare benefits are broadly defined,"
the most important retiree welfare benefits are medical insurance, life
insurance and coverage for prescriptions, hospital care and surgery
' 1 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.Sd at 139; Pabst Brewing Co. v, Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 442
(7th Cir. 1998); Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517; see also Donald T. Weckstein, The Problematic
Provisions and Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101,
132 (1987) (viewing contract doctrine to prevent vested benefits); Gregory Parker Rogers,
Comment, Rethinking Yard-Man: Fundamental Contract Principles in Retiree Benefits Litigation,
37 Emma 14. 1033, 1066-67 (1988) (argiling benefits do not continue absent language
specifically stating that they do).
11 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 141; Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608
(7th Cir. 1993).
15 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.Sd at 140-41; Corrao, 161 F.3d at 442; Anderson, 836 F.2d at
1517.
II For example, courts must determine whether an agreement is ambiguous and there-
fore may be clarified using extrinsic evidence. See generally Alison M. Sultenic, Promises,
Promises: Using the Parol Evidence Rule to Manage Extrinsic Evidence in ERISA Litigation, 3 U.
PA. J. LAB. & Earl. L. 1 (2000); see also Rogers, supra note 11, at 1061-65. Courts may also
need to decide if quasi-contractual claims such as promissory estoppel or equitable estop.
pel can be used to protect retiree benefits. See Fisk, supra note 5, at 170; Steven J. Sacher &
David Pickle, Litigation Involving Retiree Welfare Benefits, A.B.A. CTR. eon CONT'G LEGAL
Etouc. NAT'L INST., Z-31, Z-41-43 (1997). Even if the courts decide that benefits are
"vested," they must determine whether benefits can be fixed at the amount when the em-
ployee retires or whether they must "ratchet" up as benefits for active employees improve.
See Bidlack, 993 E2d at 614 (Easterbrook, j., dissenting); Weckstein, supra note 11, at 130.
15 The other type of employer.provided benefits are traditional pensions, which are
cash payments from a trust fund operated by the employer that guarantee retirees income
after they leave the workforce. See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 109. These benefits are fully
protected by federal statute and will not be considered here. See infra text accompanying
note 114.
16 The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ER1SA) defines employee wel-
fare benefits as "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship
or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal serv-
ices." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
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for retirees and their dependents." The scope of this Note is limited
to situations in which the retiree health benefits were conveyed
through collective bargaining agreements. 18
 Most importantly, this
Note discusses the extent to which courts should protect retiree ex-
pectations of lifetime medical benefits when the collective bargaining
agreement granting the benefits is ambiguous or silent as to their du-
ration. 19
While additional empirical research is necessary to confirm its
arguments, this Note suggests that, until recently, continued welfare
benefits for retirees were a social norm of the unionized workplace
that both employers and employees accepted." Part I reviews the re-
cent trends in retiree benefits that have affected this issue and dem-
onstrates the long history of these benefits in unionized workplaces."
Part II looks at relevant United States Supreme Court decisions and
federal statutes that have shaped the current litigation. 22 This section
also shows the deep division this issue has created in the federal
courts by discussing the differing views United States Courts of Ap-
peals have expressed regarding the protection of the expectations of
retirees and employees." Part III explores employee expectations of
continued benefits and seeks to determine if it is appropriate for
courts to consider them in benefits litigation." Particularly because
the claims at issue arise in the unique context of collective bargaining
where unions represent employees, it argues that courts should con-
sider the workers' expectations in benefit-termination litigation. 25
Part IV then considers whether a rebuttable presumption that benefits
vest is compatible with Congress's national labor policies." Ultimately,
it concludes that because expectations of continued benefits are rea-
17 See Seth Kupferberg, Double Effects in Economics and Lau; with Special Reference to
ERISA, 73 OR. L. REV. 467,486 (1994).
18
 Courts generally hold that retiree health benefits not provided through a negotiated
collective bargaining agreement will be treated differently than those conveyed under a
collective bargaining agreement in a unionized workplace. See Rossetto, 217 ESd at 543-44.
In these cases, employers generally prevail because courts are less likely to find that em-
ployers who grant benefits unilaterally intend to bind themselves to perpetual obligations.
See Edward Lee Isler & Mark Snyderman, Bidlack v VVheelabrator: Revisiting the Chaos of Retiree
Medical Litigation, 7 BENEFITS U. 25,39 (1994).
19
 See infra notes 251-416 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 30-68 and accompanying text.
22
 See infra notes 69-123 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 124-250 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 251-370 and accompanying text.
25
 See infra notes 332-370 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 371-416 and accompanying text.
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sonable in light of the union workplace and such an approach is con-
sistent with federal policy, courts should apply a rebuttable presump-
tion that such benefits vest once retirees prove the agreement provid-
ing them is ambiguous, and then allow employers to present evidence
that overcomes the presumption. 27 Despite arguments against such an
approach,28 courts are more likely to reach a fair and appropriate re-
sult if they consider the bargaining context and protect worker expec-
tations.°
I. TRENDS IN RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS
After World War II, health and retirement benefits became wide-
spread because unions became interested in gaining such plans for
their members and pressed for these benefits in collective bargaining
negotiations.° As a result of union interest and the process of collec-
tive bargaining, retirement and health benefits became nearly twice as
common for unionized workers as for the general working popula-
tion, thus establishing such benefits as a fundamental characteristic of
the unionized workplace." By the 1960s and 1970s, many employers
agreed to provide retiree health benefits because it was relatively in-
expensive for them to do so." In 1962, for example, employer-
provided health insurance accounted for only 2.7% of the typical pri-
vate employer's total costs for employee compensation." Additionally,
the value and availability of retirement medical benefits generally re-
mained constant or improved with each new agreement during the
1960s and 1970s." While a majority of collective bargaining agree-
27 See infra notes 407-416 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 209-246 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 251-416 and accompanying text.
" SUMNER H. SLIGHTER, JAMES J. HEALY & E. ROBERT LIVERNASH, IMPACT OF COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 403 (1960).
31 See id. at 404.
" See Kupferberg, supra note 17, at 486.
33 See CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 241 (87th ed.
1966) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1966). The maximum benefit paid out under
nearly 75% of contracts was less than $2,000. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PAT-
TERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 44:6 (5th ed. 1961) [hereinafter BASIC PATTERNS, 5th ed.].
31 See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating
agreements from 1953 to 1984 included more and better welfare benefits for both active
employees and retirees); Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 1993)
(describing language relating to retiree benefits in collective agreements between 1965
and 1986 to be materially identical); Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467, 468-69
(Wis. 2000) (considering agreements between 1972 and 1995 using same language for
welfare benefits and no substantial changes limiting benefits occurred until 1989).
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ments in the early 1960s did not provide post-retirement medical
benefits, the number of contracts that did was increasing rapidly. 35 By
1980, over half of private collective bargaining agreements offered
welfare benefits that continued into retirement. 36
Beginning in the 1980s, the cost of medical benefits for retirees
first surpassed and ultimately dwarfed the rate of general inflation.37
The general inflation rate as measured by the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) from 1977 to 1987 was about 8770. 38
 During that same period,
personal health care costs for those sixty-five and older increased by
258%. 39
 This dramatic surge in medical costs, coupled with increased
economic competition from foreign manufacturers, prompted many
employers to reduce costs to avoid bankruptcy or plant closings. 40 As
part of these cost-cutting measures, some struggling employers re-
duced retiree welfare benefits for the first time. 41
 The modifications
ranged from modest changes like higher co-payments or deductibles,
lower lifetime caps on benefits, and increased , reliance on managed
care techniques, to unprecedented attempts to terminate retiree
medical benefits completely. 42
 The situation for some employers was
so dire that even these efforts failed to maintain their economic viabil-
i ty.43
The situation was fundamentally altered in the early 1990s as
employers braced for the impact of Financial Accounting Standard
106 (FAS 106), which was adopted by the Financial Accounting Stan-
33 See BASIC PATTERNS, 5th ed., supra note 33, at 44:6. For example, the number of
agreements offering post-retirement benefits increased by one third between the late
1950s and the early 1960s. Id.
36 See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 43 (10th ed.
1983) [hereinafter BASIC PATTERNS, 10th ed.].
" See Kupferberg, supra note 17, at 487.
38 See CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 469 (112th ed.
1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1992]. The CPI states the change in prices for a
group of goods as measured by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. See
id. at 465. The rate of inflation can be determined by comparing the percent change in
the CPI between different time periods. See id. at 467.
" Michael S. Melbinger & Marianne W. Culver, The Battle of the Rust Belt: Employers'
Rights to Modify
 the Medical Benefits of Retirees, 5 DEPAut, Bus. L.J. 139, 140 (1993).
46 See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 102.
41 See Brouwer, supra note 5, at 986 n.19 (reporting that 39% of employers had
changed coverage in the late 1980s).
42 See Sather & Pickle, supra note 14, at Z-32.
43
 See Corrao, 161 F.3d at 437 (closing plant even after benefits' termination).
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dards Board (FASB). 44 Effective in late 1992, the new rule required
employers to recognize the expected cost of retiree benefits for cur-
rent and future retirees in the current year rather than in the year
those costs were actually incurred.* In other words, employers
needed to "reflect on their balance sheets the present value of the
estimated future costs for retirees' medical benefits." 46 Because it ar-
rived when the annual increase of health care costs for private em-
ployers was estimated at approximately 20% 4' FAS 106 required em-
ployers to report huge future liabilities on their financial statements.*
Many companies decided that these benefits were simply too expen-
sive and pointed to the large costs to justify their termination of
medical coverage for retired employees.*
Sustained reductions, modifications, and terminations have al-
tered the benefits of American retirees dramatically, and, while these
alterations have occurred over the last fifteen years, the change has
come most rapidly within the last decade." For example, according to
data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 64% of large-
and medium-sized private employers provided life insurance benefits
to retirees in 1981.51 By 1986, that percentage had decreased only
slightly to 59%.52 In the 1990s, however, the percentage of employers
44 See Sultenic, supra note 14, at 15. FASB is a private organization that promulgates
rules for the preparation of financial reports and uniform accounting standards. UAW v.
Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.Sd 130, 136 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
45 See Sultenic, supra note 14, at 15.
46 Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 1993).
47 See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Employer Health Care Costs Rising At 21 Percent Rate, Report
Says, DAILY LAB. REK, Jan, 14, 1991, at A-3 [hereinafter Employer Health Care Costs] (citing
increase in costs between 1987 and 1989). Employers' healthcare costs per employee also
increased 23% from 1990 to 1992. See Tamara E. Russell, Tratr'lin Light: Early Retirees and the
Availability of Post-Retirement Health Benefits, 22 Am. J.L. & MED. 537, 539 (1996) (reporting
employer health costs rose from $3,217 in 1990 to $3,968 in 1992).
See generally Amanda Bennett, Firms Stunned by Retiree Health Costs, WALL ST. J., May
24, 1988 (reporting employers' future liabilities for healthcare in 1988 totaled 12% of their
payrolls and such costs would reduce profits by several billion dollars).
0 See Schultz, supra note 2, at Al, Ironically, however, employers found that they
greatly exaggerated the cost of these benefits and never actually encountered the huge
costs they predicted. Id. In fact, some employers' profit margins increased as a result of the
adjustments they needed to make on their financial reports to reflect the lower costs. See
id.
s° See infra notes 51-57.
51 See Current Labor Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1997, at 73 [hereinafter CLS
1997].
52 See id. After the 1986 survey, the BLS changed the definition of large and medium
employers to include employers in all industries employing 100 or more workers. See id. at
73 n.l.
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offering that benefit declined precipitously to 33% in 1997. 53 Also in
1997, only 19.5% of the nation's employers offered health insurance
programs that continued to cover retirees after age sixty-five." In the
early 1990s, 59% of private employers offered such continued
benefits.55
 Additionally, while 69% of remaining employer-provided
medical plans require participants to contribute to their plans, only
one third of employees were required to contribute to their benefits
prior to the mid-1980s.56
 Moreover, the amount of this contribution
has doubled during the past decade—from about $20 per month in
1988 to nearly $40 per month in 1997.57
Whether retirees themselves or their former employers cover re-
tiree medical costs, paying for medical care poses a tremendous chal-
lenge, considering that the current cost of healthcare for Americans
over age sixty-five is $5,864 per year. 55
 Furthermore, while the yearly
change in the cost of medical care between 1993 and 1999 averaged
roughly 4.5%,59
 health costs are expected to rise by more than 10% in
coming years.5° Personal healthcare costs for retirees are also likely to
be substintial because retirees who live to age sixty-five can expect to
live for an average of eighteen additional years.61
 Because the median
yearly income of American males over age sixty-five is $18,166 per
year, there is legitimate concern that years of high medical bills might
53 See Current Labor . Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1999, at 75 [hereinafter CLS
1999].
54
 CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (120th ed.
2000) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 20001.
55
 Employer Health Care Costs, supra note 47, at A-3 (reporting survey of over 900 em-
ployers' medical plans).
50 CLS 1999, supra note 53, at 75. It was not until 1991, for example, that more than
50% of employees were required to contribute to their health benefits. Id. While these
data are based on employer-provided plans for all employees, both active and retirees, they
accurately reflect the availability and terms of retiree welfare benefit plans because many
collective bargaining agreements stated that the retirees' benefits are to be equal to the
benefits provided to active employees. See UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1480 (6th
Cir. 1983).
57
 0:L41999, supra note 53, at 75.
55
 OLDER AMERICANS 2000: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY
FORUM ON AGING-RELATED STATISTICS 40 (2000) [hereinafter OLDER AMERICANS 2000].
The costs also grow significantly in the years after age sixty-five, as the average annual cost
of caring for those ages seventy-five to seventy-nine is $9,414. See id.
59 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 54, at 487.
6° Andy Miller, Employer Survey: Costs Sharply Rise for Health limps, ATLANTA CONST.,
Dec. 12, 2000, at El. (citing survey of over 3,300 employers nationwide).
01
 OLDER AMERICANS 2000, supra note 58, at 22. This was an increase from the 1990
Census. See id.
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eradicate a person's savings. 62 While retirees older than age sixty-five
are eligible for Medicare, that program only covers about fifty percent
of an individual's health costs. 65 Retirees on Medicare must still seek
supplemental insurance to cover the cost of prescription drugs and
long-term hospital care."
Alternatively, employers who are required to pay for their retir-
ees' lifelong medical costs would be responsible for covering what
Medicare does not.65 Providing health benefits to Medicare-eligible
retirees in 1997 cost employers $1,910 per retiree. 66 In some cases,
employers' healthcare liabilities 'can equal 20% to 40% of their net
worth.67 Considering the life expectancies of today's retirees, employ-
ers could face the difficulties imposed by a program covering such
high costs for perhaps as many as twenty years. 68
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF BENEFITS TERMINATION LITIGATION
A. Federal Statutes and Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Benefits Litigation
Once employers began to unilaterally modify retiree medical
benefits in the mid-1980s, retirees and their former unions jointly
sued to maintain them. 69 While no previous Supreme Court decisions
or federal statutes directly governed these suits, some prior law af-
fected how federal courts would address their legal claims. 70 The
Court and Congress established principles in the 1960s and 1970s that
continue to impact benefits termination litigation today. 71
ds See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 54, at 473. For women above age sixty-
five, the challenge seems even greater as their median income in 1998 was $10,504, See id.
See Berneking, supra note 5, at 268.
64 See id.; see also Kupferberg, supra note 17, at 486.
65 Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Retiree Benefits: Employee Contributions and Managed Care Help
Employees Cut Retiree Health Expenses, DAILY LAB. RE'., June 10, 1998, at A-11 (citing survey
of 300 employers).
o See id. One area of particular concern is the cost of prescription drugs for retirees,
which are yet to be covered by Medicare and are estimated to cost employers 23,4% more
in 2001 than in 2000. See Carlos Tejada, Work Week, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2000, at Al.
67 See generally Bennett, supra note 48.
o See OLDER AMERICANS 2000, supra note 58, at 22 (anticipating health costs for retir-
ees would continue for, on average, eighteen years based on life expectancy).
See, e.g., Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512, 1515 (8th Cir. 1988);
United Steelworkers v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1987); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.,
716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983).
" See Rogers, supra note 11, at 1039-40.
71 See, e.g., UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1999); Int'l Ass'n
Machinists v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1997); Am. Fed'ri of Grain Millers
1224	 Boston College Law Review
	 (Vol. 42:1215
For example, in 1971 in Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co.," the Supreme Court blocked retirees' claims that em-
ployers committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)" when they unilaterally modified
retiree welfare benefits. 74 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, an employer de-
cided to substitute its own coverage of retiree medical benefits with
supplemental insurance provided through the then recently-enacted
Medicare program, a national health program for seniors." The un-
ion, which represented the retirees when they were active workers,
claimed that because retirement welfare benefits were secured
through a negotiated collective bargaining agreement, the NLRA re-
quired the employer to negotiate with the union before instituting
any changes to the benefits plan. 76
 The Court disagreed, however,
and, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, established several guiding
principles that have had a tremendous impact on subsequent litiga-
tion.77
In Pittsburgh Plate and Glass, the Court held that an employer has
no obligation to bargain with the union over changes to retiree health
benefits before implementing those changes." Under section 8d of
the NLRA, employers are required to bargain with unions over issues
that the Court considers mandatory subjects of bargaining." The
Court, however, classified modifications to retiree welfare benefits as a
nonmandatory, or permissive, subject of bargaining." A unilateral
change to retiree welfare benefits therefore cannot be remedied un-
der the NLRA because an employer violates no provision of the NLRA
by refusing to discuss the change with the union. 81
 Moreover, the pro-
tections the NLRA provides to striking employees do not extend to
v. Intl Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1997); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1484;
Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Wis. 2000).
72 See 404 U.S. 157, 157 (1971).
"29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
74
 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 160.
76 Id. at 161. The cost of the supplemental insurance was lower for the employer, but
the retirees' benefits would have remained roughly unchanged. See id.
76 Id. at 162.
77 See id. at 188; see also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d at 603, 609 (7th Cir.
1993); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
78 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 182,
79 See id. at 185.
80 See id. at 188.
91 See id.
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those who strike over permissive subjects of bargaining. 82 After Pitts-
burgh Plate and Glass, employers have little fear a union will strike in
response to a decision to modify or terminate retiree welfare
benefits.83
Additionally, in Pittsburgh Plate and Glass, the Court found the in-
terests of active employees and retirees so different that the union
could not represent both groups in future negotiations. 84 In order to
prevent internal conflicts that could impair the function of a union
and disrupt the bargaining process, a union may only represent a
"bargaining unit," consisting of a group of employees who share "sub-
stantial mutual interests in wages, hours, and other conditions of em-
ployment."86 Because the Court considered the interests of retirees
limited "only to retirement benefits, to the exclusion of wage rates,
hours, working conditions, and all other terms of active employment,"
retirees and active employees lacked a mutuality of interests that al-
lowed the union to represent them both. 86 Unions could not ade-
quately advocate the interests of both groups because, while retirees
would likely support a greater sacrifice of current wages for increased
retirement benefits, active employees would prefer higher current
wages.87
Moreover, by excluding retirees from the bargaining unit, the
Court freed unions from any obligation to protect retirees' rights and
interests in future rounds of collective bargaining. 88 Unions have a
duty to fairly represent the claims and interests of all members of the
82 See NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (hold-
ing insistence upon a non-mandatory subject of bargaining to point of strike unlawful); see
also Detroit Typographical Union No. 18 v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (not-
ing National Labor Relations Board "has found that a strike or other economic action in
support of a proposal on a nonmandatory bargaining subject is unlawful").
85 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. As an example of how formal labor law does not
represent the reality of the employment relationship, however, a strong union can occa-
sionally threaten to strike against a vulnerable employer over retiree health benefits. Labor
law or no labor law, the threat can cause the employer to deal with the union. See Rebecca
Blumenstein, Seeking a Cure: Auto Makers Attack High Health-Care Bills with a New Approach,
WALL. ST . J., Dec. 9, 1996, at Al (discussing UAW's threatened strike of U.S. auto makers
for proposed changes to retiree medical benefits and auto makers' subsequent capitula-
tion on issue to avoid strike).
84 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 173.
g5 See id. This requirement seeks to promote the goal of efficient collective bargaining
and ensures the union will speak with a coherent voice. See id. at 172-73.
86 See id. at 173.
87 See id.
ee See id. at 180 n.20.
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bargaining unit, but the duty extends to only current members."
Pittsburgh Plate and Glass also freed unions from a duty to involve retir-
ees in union policy-making and decisions to accept new contracts be-
cause they are not members of the bargaining unit."
While foreclosing an unfair labor practice claim, the Court pro-
vided an alternative to retirees who sought to protect their benefits. 91
In a footnote, Justice Brennan observed that "Winder established
contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be altered with-
out the pensioners' consent [and retirees could have al federal rem-
edy under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for
breach of contract if [their] benefits were unilaterally altered."92 Jus-
tice Brennan's language indicated that vested benefits could be pro-
tected but gave no further guidance as to what contract principles he
was referring or what constituted vesting. 93
Subsequent retirees whose benefits were reduced and the unions
that had negotiated the collective bargaining agreement therefore
jointly sued employers in federal court under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) 94 for breach of contract." Dis-
putes under section 301 are subject to a substantial body of law that
gives great authority to the federal courts. 96 Federal courts not only
have jurisdiction to hear disputes under section 301, but are author-
ized "to fashion a body of federal common law for the enforcement of
these collective bargaining agreements."97 In the opinion of the Su-
preme Court, when Congress enacted section 301, it granted federal
" See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
9° Edward B. Miller, 60 Years of Supreme Court Labor Law Decisions: A Look at Six Sample
Years, in ME NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 60 YEARS LATER B-1, B-5 (1995).
91 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20.
" Id.
" See id.; see also Rogers, supra note 11, at 1041; Joseph R. Weeks, Continuing Liability
Under Expired Collective Bargaining Agreements Parts II & III, 15 OKLA. CM' U. L. REV. 359,
579 (1990) (expressing uncertainty as to what contract principles Pittsburgh Plate Glass re-
ferred).
" 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000). Section 301 and the rest of the LMRA were part of the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which modified the original NLRA. The pre-1947 elements of the
NLRA are referred to as the Wagner Act and named after the Act's sponsor, Senator Rob-
ert F. Wagner. See Patrick Hardin, Sixty Years of Supreme Court Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court
Interprets the National Labor Relations Act, to THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 60 YEARS
LATER A-1 (1995).
See, e.g., Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 137; Masonite, 122 F.3d at 230; Yard-Man, 716 F.2d
at 1478.
9° See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 354-55 (2d ed. 1994).
97 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).
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courts power to create substantive law so long as that law promoted
the policies of the nation's labor laws 98
In 1960, in United Steelworkers' v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the
Supreme Court defined and expanded the courts' power to fashion
federal common law. 99 The case 'concerned a dispute over the inter-
pretation of an ambiguous arbitration clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement:109 The union sought to compel arbitration over the
employer's decision to contract out work because it interpreted the
contract to require such arbitration. 191 The employer, however, con-
tended that the decision to contract out work was a function of man-
agement and that the agreement exempted such functions from an
arbitrator's review' 92 To settle the dispute over interpretation, the
Court began by stating that it perceived one of the goals of national
labor policy to be. the promotion of industrial stabilization through
collective bargaining agreements. 198 Because the Court believed arbi-
tration promoted that goal through peaceful settlements rather than
strikes, it forced the employer to submit the issue to the agreement's
arbitration procedure.'"
Furthermore, the Court concluded the issue was appropriate for
arbitration because the contract gave no "positive assurance that the
arbitration clause was not susceptible to an interpretation that [cov-
ered] the asserted dispute." 195 hi other words, the Court ruled the
dispute should be resolved through arbitration because, although no
provision of the contract expressly required arbitration, no language
in the contract expressly demonstrated the parties intended that the
99 Id. at 456. To ensure national uniformity, even state courts hearing disputes related
to collective bargaining agreements must abide by this substantive law. See Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (requiring states to apply federal common law when
hearing actions brought under section 301).
99 See 363 U.S. 574, 574 (1960). The "Steelworkers Trilogy" is comprised of United Steel-
WadierS v. Enterprise Wheel & Car corp., 363 U.S. 593, 593 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Ameri-
can Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564 (1960), and Warrior & Gulf Navigation. See James B. Zima-
rowski, Interpreting Collective Bargaining Agreements: Silence, Ambiguity and NLRA Section 8(d),
10 INnus. REL. L.J. 465, 466 n.2 (1998). The Trilogy confirmed the Court's view that re-
solving labor disputes through arbitration promotes the goals of federal policy and is "part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process." See Warrior C.o' Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at
578. The Court reaffirmed the Trilogy in AT&T Tech. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S.
643, 648 (1986).
10° Warrior & Guy'Navigation, 363 U.S. at 576-77.
1°1 Id. at 577.
1 °2 Id.
lob
	 at 578.
1" Id. at 585. ,
195 Warrior &I Gulf 	 363 U.S. at 582-83.
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issue not be resolved through arbitration. 106 The Court recognized
that because arbitration is a matter of contract, no party could be
forced to submit any subject to arbitration unless it agreed to do so." 7
The Court explained, however, that the congressional policy of indus-
trial stabilization could only be fully realized if courts adopted a pre-
sumption that any doubts about coverage would be settled in favor of
coverage. 108
 Unless the collective bargaining agreement specifically
stated the dispute was not arbitrable, it would go to arbitration.m
Thus, the Court established that courts could create a presumption in
the face of a contractual ambiguity if such a presumption fulfills na-
tional labor policy. 1"
In addition to the NLRA and section 301, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 111 has guided courts de-
ciding welfare benefits
. Enacted shortly after Pittsburgh
Plate Glass, ERISA governs much of the operation of both pension and
welfare benefits plans." 5 One of its most important provisions man-
dates that pension benefits vest in accordance with a detailed proce-
dure. 114
 ERISA, however, neither mandates that welfare benefits
vest, 115
 nor expressly prohibits the vesting of welfare benefits or
authorizes unilateral termination of welfare benefits.n 6 Instead,
ERISA provides only three explicit protections for welfare benefits: 1)
plan administrators must act as fiduciaries for retirees; 2) there must
be reporting and disclosure of the plan's terms; and 3) retirees have a
cause of action in federal court for an • employer's breach of duty un-
der the plan.m There are few additional specifics on how the benefits
are to be protected or under what circumstances retirees may re-
cover. 118
 Although proposed legislation would expand protections of
106 See id at 583.
157
 Id. at 582.
109 Id. at 583.
I" See id.
115
 See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
In 29 U.S.C. § 1001(2000).
115
 See Skinne r Engine, 188 F.3d at 137-38; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1516.
115 See Fisk, supra note 5, at 167.
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000).
115 See id. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a) (1) (exempting welfare benefits from vesting require.
ments).
116 See Brouwer, supra note 5, at 988; see also Sacher & Pickle, supra note 14, at Z-32.
117 See Fisk, supra note 5, at 167.
118 See id.
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retiree health benefits, Congress has yet to amend ERISA's provisions
in this area.'"
Furthermore, ERISA preempts all state regulation of employee
welfare benefit plans. 12° As a result, much stronger protections retir-
ees enjoyed under pre-ERISA state programs were replaced with
ER1SA's minimal provisions. 121 For example, Hawaii previously man-
dated that employer-provided health insurance continue after workers
retire. 122 Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court required employee wel-
fare benefits to vest upon creation, while ERISA does not. 125
B. The Federal Courts Are Split over Retiree Health Benefits
Due to the changing realities of the workplace, federal courts be-
gan to hear section 301 breach of contract actions in which retirees
and their former unions claimed employers breached collective bar-
gaining agreements by terminating vested medical benefits. 124 Despite
the framework of federal statutes, and the Supreme Court decisions
set out above, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has expressly
explained how federal courts should determine if retiree welfare
benefits vested under collective bargaining agreements. 125 When liti-
gants appealed the decisions of federal district courts to the United
States appeals courts, each circuit needed to determine how it would
resolve the issue within its jurisdiction. 126 All circuits recognize that
119 See generally Emergency Retiree Health Benefits Protection Act, FIR. 1322, 107th
Long. (2001). If enacted, this Act would prohibit termination of retiree health benefits
even if the employer's health plan reserves a general power to terminate or modify the
plan. In March 2001, it was referred to the House of Representatives Committee on Educa-
tion and the Workforce.
1" See Fisk, supra note 5, at 167.
121 See id. at 164.
122 Id .
123 See id. at 230-31.
124 See, e.g., Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 136-37; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d
434, 437 (7th Cir. 1998); Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 978; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1515; Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1478. Although most of these suits also involved claims tinder section 502
of ER1SA, this Note primarily focuses on the cases' section 301 claims.
199 The Supreme Court has ruled that ERISA does not establish any minimum partici-
pation, vesting, or funding requirements for welfare plans as it does for pension plans. See
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). The Coors's Curtiss-Wright
decision, however, sheds little light on what factors courts may consider in determining
whether the collective bargaining agreement has vested the benefits because the retirees in
that case did not bring a claim under section 301. See id. (considering only amendment
procedure of section 402(b) (3) of ERISA).
1113 See, e.g., Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 136-37; Corrao, 161 F.3d at 437; Grain Millers, 116
F.3d at 978; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1515; Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478.
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ERISA does not expressly require welfare benefits to vest upon crea-
tion.'" Parties to the agreement can agree to contract around ERISA,
however, and draft a contract that vests welfare benefits upon an em-
ployee's retirement. 125 Yet, nearly every jurisdiction has developed its
own standard to determine when the parties intended retiree health
benefits to vest.'"
The most important issue in welfare benefits termination cases is
whether the two parties to the agreement, the employer and the un-
ion, mutually intended to provide benefits that lasted beyond the life
of the agreement:13o While courts hearing disputes brought under
section 301 are obligated to apply federal common law as shaped by
national labor policies set by Congress, they may also apply traditional
contract principles to determine the parties' intentions when those
principles are not inconsistent with national policy. 131
If the language of the collective bargaining agreement unambi-
guously describes the duration of the retirees' medical benefits, courts
will abide by the language of the contract and consider that language
to be completely indicative of the parties' intent. 152 If, instead, the
language is ambiguous as to whether the benefits were intended to
vest, courts allow both sides to introduce extrinsic evidence to clarify
the parties' intentions at the formation of the agreement.'" The de-
gree to which a court protects the expectations of the employees and
considers the context of the unionized workplace greatly affects both
the determination of ambiguity and the ultimate question of what the
parties intended. 134
12T See, e.g., Maurer v. joy Tech. Inc., 212 F.3d 907,914 (6th Cir. 2000); Skinner Engine,
188 F.3d at 137-38; Corrao, 161 F.3d at 439; Masonite, 122 F.3d at 231.
128 See Piitslmrgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20.
129 See, e.g., Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 980 (citing circuits' disagreement over document
interpretation and presumptions of vesting).
130
 See id.; see also Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 138-39; Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
131 See, e.g., Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 577-78; Maurer, 212 F.3d at 915;
Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 138; Masonite, 122 F.3d at 231.
132
 See Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 980; see also Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 138-39; Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
133 See Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 980; see also Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 138-39; Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
134 Compare Keifer v. H.K. Porter, Co., 872 F.2d 60,64 (4th Cir. 1989), and Yard-Man,
716 F.2d at 1482-83, and Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472, with Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 147, and
Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
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1. Courts Considering Employee Expectations
In 1983, in UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit relied in part on employee expectations to
find that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement intended
retiree welfare benefits to vest. 133 Although one of the earliest
benefits-termination cases, Yard-Man has remained the leading case
for claims that the parties intended retiree welfare benefits to vest.'"
In Yard-Man, an employer notified retirees in April 1977 that it in-
tended to terminate their insurance benefits when the collective bar-
gaining agreement expired two months later, on June 1, 1977. 137 At
trial, the employer stated that the contract's terms clearly and unam-
biguously limited the benefits to the life of the agreement."& The con-
tract stated: "When the former employee has attained the age of 65
years, then: (1) The Company will provide insurance benefits equal to
the active group benefits . for the former employee and his
spouse."'" The union maintained this language was evidence of an
intent to provide lifetime retiree medical benefits. 140 The district
court ruled for the union and the retirees and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. 14"
The Yard-Man court began its decision by finding that the agree-
ment was ambiguous as to the benefits' duration. 142 It considered the
agreement's language and found two competing interpretations
equally reasonable. 143 One could read the phrase "will provide insur-
ance benefits equal to the active group" as a mere characterization of
the nature of the benefits, as the union suggested.'" The phrase
could also be read to incorporate a durational limit to the benefits
and mean that once active benefits are terminated due to a plant clos-
ing or the expiration of the agreement, retiree benefits are likewise
135 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
116 See Maurer, 212 F.3d at 914-15; Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring);
Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64; Rath, 619 N.W.2d at 472.
1 " Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478.
I" Id. at 1480.
I" See id.
140 See id.
HI See id. at 1478.
142 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480.
1 " See id.
144 Id.
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terminated. 145 Due to this ambiguity, the court turned to extrinsic
evidence to determine the intent of the parties. 146
The court considered several other clauses of the agreement and
largely determined the intent of the parties based on the contract's
specific language. 147 In addition to considering the contract's lan-
guage, however, the court looked to a final factor to arrive at the deci-
sion's most noteworthy and controversial element." 48 It inferred from
the context of the bargaining situation that the parties intended
benefits to vest. 149 The court based this inference, now known as the
"Yard-Man Inference," on what it perceived to be conditions in the
employment relationship that create employee expectations of con-
tinued benefits.'"
First, the Yard-Man court noted that retirees had an expectation
of future benefits because retirement welfare benefits are "typically
understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for past
services."151 Retirees, therefore, earned these benefits because they
had previously sacrificed wages for an anticipated payment of retire-
ment benefits in the future.152 The retirees presumably knew, how-
ever, that the union had no duty to represent them and, therefore,
could negotiate those benefits away in future collective bargaining.'"
The court found it unlikely for retirees to leave unprotected and sub-
ject to bargaining in which they would not be represented the
benefits that they had made previous sacrifices to gain.154 The court
thus observed that retirees would expect their retirement medical
benefits to be guaranteed, regardless of the bargain reached in subse-
quent agreements.155 Because the court believed the parties negotiat-
ing the agreement knew such expectations would arise in response to
this delayed compensation, it inferred that the benefits' inclusion in
the contract indicated the parties intended the benefits to vest.'"
145 Id.
"6 Id.
147 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481-82 (finding employer's past payment of benefits de-
spite expiration of collective bargaining agreement, lack of specific limitation on welfare
benefits, and other contract language indicated intent to vest benefits).
148 See id. at 1482.
149 see id.
15° See id.
"I Id.
155 Yard.Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
In Id. (citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181-82).
"4 Id.
II" Id.
186 See id.
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Second, the court labeled retiree welfare benefits "status"
benefits that create an expectation among employees that the benefits
would continue as long as the person maintained such a status. 157 Be-
cause the parties agreed to provide benefits of this nature, the court
decided it was logical to infer that the parties intended to agree to
vested benefits. 158 The rationale was that the parties must have real-
ized what expectations such benefits would create and that they had
considered the implications of such a choice. 159 The Yard-Man court
decided that the employer was obligated to fulfill the expectations the
agreement had created.m Again, the inclusion of the benefits in the
collective bargaining agreement became grounds to infer that the
benefits were intended to vest. 161 The Sixth Circuit continues to apply
the "Yard-Man Inference" in cases where former union employees
claim an ambiguous collective bargaining agreement granted them
vested rights. 162
fudges outside the Sixth Circuit have relied on the expectations
of employees to justify a presumption 163 that vests retiree welfare
benefits upon retirement and requires employers to prove that
benefits were not intended to continue for life.'" While the opinions
have limited precedential value, each presents arguments for such a
presumption. 165 The first of these opinions comes from a concurrence
by Judge Richard Cudahy in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., a 1993 deci-
sion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 166 The concurrence argued that, absent an unambiguous con-
tract stating the benefits' duration, courts should apply a rebuttable
presumption that benefits vested upon retirement. 167 In Bidlack, em-
ployees who had retired before 1986 sued their employer after it dis-
continued retiree medical benefits that were conferred in a collective
157 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
158 Id.
I" Id. at 1482-83.
166 See id. at 1482,
101 Id.
10 See Maurer, 212 F,3d at 914-15; UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F,3d 768, '773
(6th Cir, 1999); Golden v, Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648,656 (6th Cir. 1996).
163 The difference, if any, between a presumption and an inference will be discussed
below. See infra notes 371-386 and accompanying text. For the purpose of this section, it is
enough to consider them both as rules based on expectations that aid retirees in proving
that benefits were vested,
154 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 473.
105 See infra notes 166-197 and accompanying text.
165 See 993 F.24 at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
167 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
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bargaining agreement. 168
 The lead opinion in Bidlack, written by
Judge Richard Posner, found that because the plaintiffs could show
the contract was ambiguous regarding medical benefits, they could
have a trial on the agreement's meaning. 169 There, the retirees could
present extrinsic evidence to clarify whether the parties intended the
benefits to be interminable.'" On remand, however, the retirees
would still bear the burden of proof and the trial court could not ap-
ply a presumption that the benefits had vested.'"
Judge Cudahy and two concurring judges agreed with the lead
opinion's position that the appropriate standard for the court was a
weak presumption, rebuttable with extrinsic evidence in the event of
an ambiguity. 172 They favored this approach because, if applied pro-
spectively, future parties could bargain easily around the rule if they
chose.'" If applied retrospectively to parties already in court, it would
allow them to present extrinsic evidence of actual intent when neces-
sary."' A weak rule, as the concurrence labels a rebuttable presump-
tion, was preferable to a strong rule that allowed introduction of ex-
trinsic evidence only after the plaintiff could show express language
indicating an intent to vest."'"
The concurrence differs, however, from the lead opinion in its
conclusion over what the weak presumption should be.'" While the
lead opinion applied a presumption against vesting, Cudahy's view of
the social reality that the parties shared at the formation of the con-
tracts convinced him to favor a presumption for vesting.'" He per-
ceived the prevailing conditions at the formation of the contracts to
168 See id. at 604,605-06.
1 °9 See id. at 608-09 (stating language "both you and your spouse will be covered for
the remainder of your lives" at no cost could reasonably be either promise to vest benefits
or mere description of benefits during contract's three-year term). Reflecting the federal
courts' widespread disagreement over the vesting of medical benefits, there was no major-
ity opinion in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bidlack. Judge Posner gained two additional
votes for the lead opinion, two other judges joined Judge Cudahy's concurrence, and the
four remaining judges dissented in an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook. See Isler &
Snyderman, supra note 18, at 32.
170 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609.
171 See id. at 611 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (wording used to characterize lead's ap-
proach); see also infra notes 256-257.
17R See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
170 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
174 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
1711 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
176 see id. (Cudahy, j., concurring).
177 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
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suggest that both the union and management intended retiree health
benefits to vest unless there was an agreement to the contrary:
Before about 1980, I seriously doubt that it occurred to
many employers to grant retiree health benefits on anything
less than a lifetime basis. The overwhelmingly prevalent
trend of labor contracts was to continue or improve retiree
benefits from contract to contract.... think that, at least
before the eighties were in full swing, prevailing conditions
suggested a presumption among unions and management
alike that retiree health benefits vested unless there was
agreement to the contrary. 178
Additionally, Cudahy recognized that in some cases, the silence
of two parties in a contract speaks more than the words. 179 There are
certain expectations that are so fundamental, they need not be nego-
tiated.'" In this instance, the expectations of continued benefits were
such that, according to Cudahy, they were never in question. 181 Under
this view, the context of the bargaining relationship makes a presump-
tion of vesting reasonable at least for those who retired prior to the
mid-1980s. 182
In Roth v. City of Glendale, a 2000 case similar to those brought in
federal court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly opted to follow
the reasoning of the Bidlack concurrence and adopted a rebuttable
presumption that the benefits vested.'" In Roth, retirees sued the city
for breach of contract in state court after the city modified benefits
gained in a series of collective bargaining agreements between 1972
and 1996. 184 A lower court held there was no intention for the
benefits to vest because the agreements were of limited duration and
were renegotiated every two years. 1 " Also, the agreements after 1989
provided progressively less generous benefits and allowed the city
greater flexibility in modifying future benefits.'" After reviewing the
differing opinions in Bidlack, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
178 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
179
	 id. at 612 n.1 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (citing ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 570 (Colin K. Kaufman ed., Supp. 1984)).
um See id. (Cudahyd., concurring).
181 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
185 See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
1e4
	 at 468-69.
185 Id. at 470.
188 Id.
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the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for further considera-
tion. 187 Because the retirees' suit was in state court and the claim did
not arise under section 301, the Supreme Court was not obligated to
rely upon the decisions of the Seventh Circuit.'" The Roth court,
however, adopted Cudahy's reasoning because the presumption he
advocated better "comport[ed] with 'a more far-reaching understand-
ing of the context in which retiree benefits arise."'" The presump-
tion was further appropriate because it fulfills the "legitimate expecta-
tions of employees who have bargained for these benefits."'"
The Roth court found these expectations legitimate for several
reasons, including those suggested in Yard-Man. 191 The Roth court
cited additional factors to support its finding that retiree welfare
benefits should presumptively vest, however. 19" Because benefits were
a recruiting tool employers used to attract and maintain workers, em-
ployers who offered retiree benefits gained the reciprocal benefit of
employee retention. 193 The court reasoned that employers who offer
their employees these benefits as an inducement cannot withdraw
them after the retirees have performed their services for the em-
ployer but before the retirees receive their reward.'" "[Once] an em-
ployee has complied with all the conditions entitling him to retire-
ment rights thereunder" the employer cannot unilaterally revoke the
benefits. 195 Where the contract does not expressly indicate the
benefits were for a fixed term, the court would not allow employers to
187 See id. at 468. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also noted that the lower court based
its ruling on a 1992 decision by, the Seventh Circuit, Senn u United Dominion Industries, 951
F.2d 806, 806 (7th Cir. 1992). See id. Under Senn, plaintiffs needed to show clear, express
language to overcome the presumption that benefits terminated at the expiration of the
agreement. See 951 F.2d at 815-16. Because the court of appeals found no such language
in the agreements, it ruled in the city's favor. See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 470. Bidlack, however,
made the continued viability of Senn highly questionable. See 993 F.2d at 610. When Roth
reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the court further questioned the lower court's
1999 opinion because it failed to consider Senn in light of Bidlack. See 614 N.W.2d at 471,
188 See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103.
188 See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472 (quoting Keifer, 872 F.2d at 64).
LW See id.
181 See id. at 472-73 (agreeing with Yard-Man that retiree benefits are status benefits
earned through prior service and holding that because retirees are not represented in
future bargaining, deferred compensation could be lost if not presumed to vest).
192 See id. at 472.
183 See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472 (citing Lovett v. Mt. Senario College, Inc., 454 N.W.2d
356 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)).
194 M.
188 See id. (quoting Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 271 N.W.2d 789, 889 (Wis.
1978)).
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modify their obligations because to do so would render the promise
of retiree benefits illusory and defy the equitable principles underly-
ing the employer-employee relationship. 196 Based on these observa-
tions, the Roth court considered the expectations valuable and legiti-
mate enough to protect, and required the employer to prove through
extrinsic evidence that they were incorrect or unfounded. 197
Few other courts outside the Sixth Circuit have given unqualified
support to Yard-Man's holding that employee expectations of contin-
ued benefits justify an inference that the parties to the agreement in-
tended benefits to vest, but it is 'frequently stated that other circuits
have accepted the "Yard-Man Inference." It has been accepted out-
right in decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth199 and Eleventh Circuits. 200 Like the Yard-Man court, however,
both of these courts only relied' on the inference to buttress an al-
ready sufficient finding that other language in the contract estab-
lished a mutual intent to vest retiree health benefits. 201
Numerous authorities report that in 1987, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United Steelworkers v. Textron,
Inc. adopted the "Yard-Man Inference.'200Y The extent to which it actu-
ally accepted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning is debatable, however. 203 In
1987, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted a preliminary injunction requiring Textron to continue to
provide retirees insurance coverage until the court could determine
196 See id. at 473.
197 See id. The concurrence in Roth would have followed the lead opinion in Bidlack.
The concurring justices stated that while the majority's preference for a vesting presump-
tion was a policy preference they shared, they were constrained by the law of contracts to
oppose it. Such a burden-shifting presuniption, the concurrence insisted, could not be
imposed upon parties who had a written collective bargaining agreement with a limited
term. Unlike the Roth majority, the concurrence viewed the expectations created by the
benefits as too weak to justify forcing the employer to prove it did not agree to lifetime
benefits, or that the expectations were unreasonable. See id. at 476 (Sykes, J., concurring).
196 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Berneking, supra note 5, at
276; Sather & Pickle, supra note 14, at Z-34,
199 See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64 (stating inclusion of retiree welfare benefits in collective
bargaining agreement created expectations of continued benefits and that recognizing
those expectations comports "with a more far-reaching understanding of the context in
which retiree benefits arise").
20° See United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988)
(stating court fully concurred with ruling of Sixth Circuit in Yard-Man).
201 See Keifer, 872 F.2d at 63; Connors Steel, 855 F.2d at 1505.
202 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140; see also Berneking, supra note 5, at 274.
205 See In re Morse Tool, 148 B.R. 97, 145 (Bnkr. D. Mass. 1992).
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whether Textron had promised to provide lifetime benefits. 204 While
never mentioning Yard-Man specifically, the district court observed
that it was "logical to infer that benefits accorded to a retiree continue
so long as that person remains a retiree."208
 When the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling, it found language in the collective
bargaining agreement that was similar to the language in Yard-Man to
be "consistent with a . . . promise to pay retirees' insurance costs
throughout their retirements." 206 The First Circuit, however, never
expressly endorsed or even addressed the Yard-Man holding that the
existence of retiree medical benefits created an inference that the
benefits were intended to vest. 207
 The experience of the First, Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits shows that while other courts have endorsed
some principles of Yard-Man and considered employee expectations
in their analysis, none have applied them as consistently as the Sixth
Circuit or as broadly as Judge Cudahy did in his concurrence. 208
2. Courts Not Giving Weight to Employee Expectations
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have rejected the rationale of Yard-Man and its prog-
eny and have concluded that it is inappropriate for courts to aid
plaintiffs by considering employee expectations in benefits termina-
tion litigation. 209
 While expressing sympathy for the retirees and rec-
ognizing that they are, disappointing workers' expectations, these
courts consider themselves constrained by the law of contracts and
labor policy to find employers had the right to unilaterally modify
benefits. 21°
For example, in 1988 in Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, the
Eighth Circuit became one of the first courts to expressly reject the
2°4 See United Steelworkers v. Textron, Inc., No. CIVA.85-4950-MC, 1987 WL 33023, at
*2 (D. Mass., Feb. 2, 1987).
2°3 See id.
296 Textron, 836 F.2d at 9. The decision stated that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient
showing to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, however, at that stage of the
proceedings, the court did not need to weigh the conflicting arguments. Id.
2°7 See Morse Tool, 148 S.R. at 145. The First Circuit also failed to mention whether it
was logical for benefits to continue as long as a person remains retired. Textron, 836 E2d at
9. The district court never reached a decision on the merits of the case after this prelimi-
nary injunction was affirmed. See Melbinger & Culver, supra note 39, at 152.
2°8 See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64; Connors Steel., 855 F.2d at 1505; Textron, 836 F.2d at 9.
209 See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140; Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
21° See Skinner; 188 F.3d at 147 (citing Corrao, 161 F.3d at 442).
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Sixth Circuit's Yard-Man approach.2" In Anderson, retirees sued to
maintain their insurance benefits after their former employer can-
celed the benefits at the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement. 212 Relying on Yard-Man, they argued that the court should
presume the benefits were intended to vest and require the employer
to prove the benefits were for a limited duration. 213 The Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected the invitation to apply a Yard-Man approach and
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the benefits were not vested.214
First, the court stated that even if it did agree with the Sixth Circuit in
Yard-Man, it would not shift the burden of persuasion to the defen-
dants.215 Second, the court rejected Yard-Man to the extent that it cre-
ated an inference that benefits are intended to vest. 216 The Anderson
court noted that ERISA exempted welfare benefits from its vesting
requirements and Congress had expressed no other labor policy that
would presumptively favor vesting. 217 Because Congress had taken a
"neutral position on this issue . . . [the court found) it is not at all in-
consistent with labor policy to require plaintiffs to prove their case
without the aid of gratuitous inferences." 218 The court considered the
contract ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evidence to clarify the lan-
guage's meaning, but the retirees could not rely on an inference
based on employee expectations of continued benefits to show the
parties to the contract intended benefits to vest. 219
As mentioned above, in Judge Posner's lead opinion in Bidlack,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that employee expectations of contin-
ued benefits do not justify a presumption or inference that the
benefits were vested.220 The court realized that employers who pro-
vided lifetime benefits to retirees "not anticipating the recent rise in
health costs ... should not expect the courts to bail them out . . . of
their improvident [contractual) commitments."221 More importantly,
however, Posner sought to protect the "limitation of liabilities that is
211 Anderson, 838 F.2d at 1517.
212 Id. at 1515.
213 Id.
2" Id.
215 See id. at 1517 (noting Sixth Circuit insisted it created an inference in Yard-Man, not
a presumption, and "(iinferences do not shift the burden").
216 See Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
2" See id.
218 Id.
219 See id.
22° See Bidlach, 993 F.2d at 609.
at See id.
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implicit in the negotiation of a written contract having a definite ex-
piration date."222 A presumption based on factors outside the lan-
guage of the collective bargaining agreement would "deprive the par-
ties of the protection of a written document."223
Instead of a presumption or inference based on employee expec-
tations, Posner applied a weak "no-vest" rule, which presumed that a
contract silent about the duration of retiree welfare benefits does not
vest the benefits. 224 The retirees could rebut this presumption, and
did so in Bidlack, if they demonstrated that the contract was ambigu-
ous.225 If the retirees demonstrated a "yawning void . . . that cries out
for an implied term," extrinsic evidence could be produced at a trial
to prove what the parties intended in the ambiguous contract. 226 The
retirees, however, would still bear the burden of persuasion to prove
that the parties intended the benefits to vest.227 Cases decided in the
Seventh Circuit since Bidlack continue to adhere to the lead opinion's
reasoning and have developed this weak "no-vest" presumption. 228
In 1999, in UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., the Third Circuit issued the
most recent rejection of the Yard-Man approach.229 Like Yard-Man,
Skinner Engine presented a dispute between an employer and union
that had negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements offer-
ing retirees benefits and promising that the employer "will continue
to provide" several types of medical coverage. 23° As with other compa-
nies who were forced to recognize huge retiree healthcare liabilities
due to FAS 106, Skinner Engine significantly reduced its retirees' wel-
fare benefits, including those for workers who were already retired. 231
The union and similarly-situated retirees sued the employer, claiming
that these changes could apply only to future retirees and constituted
222 See id. at 608.
27-5 See id.
224 See id.
225 See &enact; 993 F.2d at 608.
22° See id.
227 See id.
228 See Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 121
S. Ct. 1191 (2001) (finding retirees demonstrated latent ambiguity that rebutted presump-
tion that benefits do continue beyond expiration of contract); Corrao, 161 F.3d at 442
(finding no ambiguity in contract that allowed extrinsic evidence to be produced and
finding employer had right to terminate benefits).
229 See 188 F.3d at 139.
22° Id. at 135.
"l Id. at 136 (describing changes as elimination of retiree life insurance, elimination
of spousal coverage, requirement of co-payments and increase in deductibles).
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a breach of contract under section 301. 232 The court rejected the un-
ion's claim, however, and affirmed the lower court's decision that the
contract did not grant the retirees vested benefits. 233
Central to the Third Circuit's holding in Skinner Engine was its
rejection of the "Yard-Man Inference" as an aid to plaintiffs. 234 First,
the court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Anderson that it
was not at all inconsistent with federal labor policy for the court to
require plaintiffs to prove that benefits had vested without the use of
gratuitous inferences.233 Because Congress had not expressly required
benefits to vest, the court found it illogical that expectations of con-
tinued benefits created by the status nature of benefits should be
grounds to find benefits had become vested as a general rule.236 It fur-
ther stated that since Congress chose to omit welfare benefits from
ERISA's vesting requirements, a presumption or inference that such
benefit may vest would be contrary to Congress's intent. 237
Secondly, the Third Circuit criticized the Yard-Man court's hold-
ing that courts should protect retirees expectations of continued
benefits because the union was not obligated to represent retirees. 238
Drawing on Posner's opinion in Bidlack, the court noted that when
the collective bargaining agreements at issue were formed, the retir-
ees were active members of the union that negotiated the agree-
ments. 838 Thus, the court held that the retirees should have taken
steps to encourage the union to include language in the collective
bargaining agreements protecting those benefits. 24° If the court de-
termines, as the court did in Skinner Engine, that the contract neither
unambiguously vests retiree medical benefits nor ambiguously sug-
gests them, the retirees have only themselves to blame for not press-
ing their union to include such language. 241 In Skinner Engine, the
court only considered the express language of the contract and, with-
out the benefit of an inference, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the
232 Id. at 136-37. The union's breach of ER1SA fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel
claims were also unsuccessful. See id. at 151-52.
233 See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 140-41.
2" See id. at 141.
2" Id. at 140-41.
258 Id. at 140.
237 Id. at 141.
2" Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141.
139 Id.
240 Id,
MI Id,
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parties to the collective bargaining agreement intended for benefits
to vest. 242
Even circuits that have not explicitly rejected Yard-Man have been
unwilling to look to employee expectations of continued benefits to
determine whether the parties intended benefits to vest. 245 Shortly
after the Eighth Circuit rejected Yard-Man in Anderson, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in 1990 in United Paperworkers International Union v. Champion In-
ternational Corp. also criticized Yard-Man.244
 While conceding that the
retirees' lack of a voice could be considered as a factor on a contract-
by-contract basis, the United Paperwarkers court rejected an approach
where such factors would apply as a general rule of law. 245 Similarly, in
American Federation of Grain Millers v. International Multi-Foods Corp., the
Second Circuit declined to express an opinion as to whether there
should be a presumption or inference of vesting if the collective bar-
gaining agreement is ambiguous. 246
The difference between the courts is clear. Some view retiree ex-
pectations as sufficient to create an inference, or even a presumption,
that the benefits were intended to vest.247
 Others do not allow extra-
contractual factors like expectations to aid retirees' attempts to prove
the contract provided lifetime benefits. 248 Where expectations are
considered, the outcome is almost always favorable to the employee,
making the employer responsible for providing interminable and po-
tentially expensive benefits. 249
 Given the potential for employee ex-
pectations to determine the outcome of these cases, it is important for
courts to determine what role, if any, these expectations and the bar-
gaining context that fosters them should have in benefits-termination
litigation. 250
242 Id. at 141-42 (finding language of contract neither unambiguously vested benefits
nor ambiguously suggested they were vested).
"3 See Grain Millers, 116 F.3d at 980; United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion
Intl Corp., 908 F.2d 1252,1261 (5th Cir. 1990).
444 See 908 F.2d at 1261.
245 See id. But see Masonite, 122 F.3d at 231 (stating in 1997 decision that United Paper-
workers merely "questioned" Yard-Man).
tia See 116 F.3d at 980.
w47 See supra notes 124-208 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 209-246 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 124-208 and accompanying text.
250 See infra notes 251-416 and accompanying text.
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III. EXPECTATIONS AS AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR VESTING
As the cases in Part II illustrate, there is a split between the cir-
cuits over how much protection courts should afford to retirees' ex-
pectations of continued benefits.251 Much of the disagreement occurs
because, with an expectation approach to welfare benefits litigation,
courts determine the contractual obligations of employers using fac-
tors from outside the collective bargaining agreement that provided
the benefits.252 Many critics of this approach consider the expecta-
tions of retirees to be an insufficient basis for requiring employers to
provide lifetime benefits.255 This section addresses the arguments for
and against the legitimacy of expectations in these cases. 254
A. Historical Elements of the Workplace that Fostered Reasonable Expectations
Courts following the Yard Man approach all justify a finding that
retiree health benefits were vested by looking to the nature of the un-
ionized workplace and the collective bargaining context. 255 Support-
ers of this approach argue that the expectations of lifetime benefits
should be protected because they are reasonable given the workplace
and the relationship in which they arose. 266 One of the main criticisms
of the Yard-Man approach has been that these factors are an in-
sufficient basis upon which to find that benefits vested. 257 These critics
suggest that while retirees may have subjectively expected benefits, the
expectations are unreasonable based upon the situation and employ-
ers should not be required to provide expensive and lifetime benefits
based on them. 268 For example, in Skinner Engine, the Third Circuit
said that the intent to provide lifetime benefits will not be inferred
lightly and required the retirees to present clear evidence from the
251 See supra notes 124-250 and accompanying text.
222 Compare Keifer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989), and UAW v. Yard-
Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983), and Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d
467, 472 (Wis. 2000), with UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 141 (3d Cir. 1999),
and Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988).
2" See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140-41; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517; Weckstein, supra
note I1, at 127; Rogers, supra note 11, at 1059.
2" See infra notes 255-370.
252 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; see also Keifer, 872 F.2d at 64; Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
2513 See, e.g., Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d at 603, 613 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Cudahy, J., concurring); Yarn Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
257 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140-41; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517.
255 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140-41; Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517; Weckstein, supra
note 11, at 130-33; Rogers, supra note 11, at 1059-60.
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contract that benefits vested. 259
 It refused to bind the employer based
on extra-contractual factors of the employment relationship, such as
elements of the workplace that would encourage expectations of con-
tinued benefits. 26° Because courts like the Third Circuit do not aid
plaintiffs by considering employee expectations, they do not require
an employer to prove that the expectations were incorrect as Judge
Cudahy or the Roth court would.2"
Courts looking to employee expectations point to several ele-
ments of the unionized workplace to demonstrate worker expecta-
tions of lifetime benefits are reasonable. 262 Judge Cudahy's Bidlack
concurrence argued that, until recently, retiree health benefits were
fundamental to the unionized workplace and that courts should pre-
sume that benefits were to vest based on the prevailing trend of con-
stant improvement or continuation of benefits that characterized the
union relationship. 263
 Although the contracts granting such benefits
were limited in duration, the benefits were almost automatically re-
newed.264
 While retiree health benefits have now become scarce, they
were not seriously threatened until the mid- to late-1980s and it was
not until FAS 106 was instituted in 1993 that widespread termination
of retiree welfare benefits really began. 265
Also, in Roth, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that employers
used welfare benefits as tools for recruitment and retention as
grounds in part for a presumption that the benefits vested. 266 Because
these benefits allowed employers to retain workers and enjoy lower
costs, the court considered it unfair to allow employers to reduce
these benefits after the employees had retired.267 If courts fail to pro-
tect these expectations, employers enjoy the benefits of low worker
266 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 141.
" See id.
261 Compare Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 141 (refusing to shift burden to employer), with
Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (arguing that court should require em-
ployer to demonstrate that expectations were incorrect), and Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472
(adopting Cudahy's Bidlack position).
262 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
203 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 612-13 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
204 See Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Healthcare, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1881, 1888 (1992).
" See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text; see also BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 14 (14th ed. 1995) [hereinafter BAsto PATTERNS,
14th ed.] (finding, in survey of contracts after 1992, over half of contracts still provide for
retiree life insurance).
266 See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
207 Id.
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mobility but need not fulfill workers' expectation that they would re-
ceive future benefits. 268 Empirical data strengthens the Roth court's
conclusion that employers use retiree and health benefits as recruit-
ing tools and gain the benefits of lower worker mobility and higher
retention.269 A survey of workers in 2000 by BLS economists also
found that employees in all age groups were significantly less likely to
have searched for a new job when their employer provided health and
retirement benefits. 2" Additionally, employees were more likely to
work for employers who offer such benefits." 71
B. Continued Benefits as a Workplace Social Norm
Critics of the Yard-Man approach might argue that even if the
benefits were historically common in the workplace, today's retirees
should not have expected to receive lifetime benefits because, as the
data in Part I indicates, the trend Judge Cudahy points to began to
change after the mid-1980s and ended completely once FAS 106 was
instituted. 272 The characteristics of the workplace that may have given
rise to such expectations in the past are no longer common. 278 Thus,
the trend of decreasingly generous benefits should have signaled to
workers that the terms of the work relationship had changed, making
retirees unable to claim that their expectations of vested employer-
provided health benefits are reasonable. 274 Because it would be inap-
propriate to require employers to pay for expensive benefits based on
these phantom expectations, critics argue, they should not be a de-
termining factor in today's litigation. 276
A careful understanding of the workplace and worker expecta-
tions is necessary, however, before an expectation of continued
benefits is dismissed as a relic of a by-gone era. 276 Research by Profes-
266 Id.
262 See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Robert G. Valletta, The Effects of Employer-Provided
Health Insurance on Worker Mobility, 49 INDUS. LAB. REL. Rev. 439,453-54 (1996) (finding
employer-provided health benefits decreased worker mobility).
27° See Joseph R. Meisenheimer II & Randy Ilg, Looking fora "Better" Job: JobSearch Activ-
ity of the Employed, MONTHLY Lim REV., Sept. 2000, at 7.
ri See id.
272 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (finding availability of benefits de-
creased and number of plans requiring co-payments increased in 1990s).
272 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
274 See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 130-33; Rogers, supra note 11, at 1059-60.
275 See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 130-33; Rogers, supra note 11, at 1059-60.
276 See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning and the Law: Exploring The Influences on Workers
Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. Rev. 447,480-95 (1999).
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sor Pauline Kim suggests that workers' understandings of their em-
ployers' legal obligations are quite resilient and not easily swayed by
changed circumstances. 277
 Her research in another area of the em-
ployment relationship may point to a common phenomenon among
employees, which would explain why even after years of reductions in
welfare benefits, they would continue to expect lifetime benefits. 278 In
a survey of workers in three states, Professor Kim found significant
numbers of workers incorrectly believed the law prevented discharges
without cause where the employer was free to discharge under the
employment at will doctrine. 279
 Only a fraction of workers realized
how few restrictions the law places on employers' ability to terminate
employees.280
 Even more surprising was that even in the face of clear
disclaimers stating employers could discharge for any reason, most of
those surveyed still believed the law prevented a discharge. 281 Moreo-
ver, personal experiences such as previous termination or past union
membership had no significant effect on the workers' understanding
of employer obligations. 282 Contrary to the assertions of the defenders
of employment at will, employees continue to overestimate the pro-
tections the law affords them despite seeing those around them lose
their jobs without cause. 288
Professor Kim explains these puzzling results by concluding that
workers confuse the norms of the internal labor market (ILM) with
formal legal rules, leading them to have high expectations of employ-
ers' duties even though the law does not hold employers to these
977 See id. at 476.
08 See id. at 493-94 (considering whether results of this study might apply to other ar-
eas of employment relationship).
219 Id. at 466. Under common law, courts presume, as a general rule, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, employment is at the will of either the employer or the em-
ployee and either party is free to end the relationship at any time, with or without cause.
See id. at 449.
29° See Kim, supra note 276, at 466. Fewer than 10% of respondents correctly under-
stood that they have only minimal legal protections in various discharge situations. See id.
at 466.
281
 For example, after reading a disclaimer stating "Company reserves the right to dis-
charge employees at any time, for any reason, with or without cause," approximately three-
fourths of those who previously thought a lawful discharge was unlawful continued to
think so. Id. at 465.
282 Id. at 476. Additionally, age and a worker's responsibility for hiring and firing did
not significantly influence the worker's understanding of the law. The only demographic
variable to significantly affect the employee's understanding of the law was education and
income level, but the effect of this variable was inconsistent. See id.
285 See Kim, supra note 276, at 451 (citing employment at will defenders Richard Ep-
stein and J. Houk Vererke).
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same standards. 284 The ILM is the "network of arrangements, under-
standings and agreements that constitute the employment relation-
ship" within a single firm or workplace. 285 These arrangements and
understandings can become norms that bind employers even though
they are under no legal obligation because employers seek to avoid
the informal sanctions that result from breaching such norms, like a
negative reputation for mistreating employees, discontented workers
that are less productive, and low morale among the employees. 286 By
confusing the norm and the formal legal rule, workers in the study
believed that the employer was bound to discharge only for cause
while state employment law did not require for-cause terminations. 287
This confusion occurs because the norm of no discharge without just
cause is widely held and commonly seen as an obligation constraining
employer behavior. 288 Professor Kim suggests that routine practices in
the workplace, such as an employer's promotion of a corporate cul-
ture emphasizing teamwork, loyalty, and fairness, reinforce and per-
petuate this confusion, 288 Research by social psychologists further
demonstrates that once people form beliefs and rely on them, they
are likely to continue to hold those beliefs even after they are pre-
sented with evidence that those beliefs are mistaken. 260
Unfortunately, little empirical research demonstrates the specific
expectations that workers have related to retiree welfare benefits. 281
No studies of worker expectations have conclusively proven that ex-
v See id. at 479. The scope of this Note does not allow for an in-depth discussion of
social norms in the employment relationship. The main themes' of the topic will be ad-
dressed here, but for an extensive consideration of norms, see Symposium, Lain Economics
Zo' Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
"5 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Watchter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Em-
ployment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913,1915 n.6 (1996). Some ILM rules include the
understanding that "wages increase with seniority, firms lay off employees in a downturn
following a seniority schedule, firms discharge employees rather than reduce their wages if
the firms prove that employees are shirking, and permanently laid-off workers receive
some severance pay." Id. at 1927.
286 See id. at 1930-31.
282 See Kim, supra note 276, at 480.
too Id. at 487. Professor Kim cites a study where 95% of those surveyed believed legal
discharges without cause should be unlawful. This was roughly the same percentage of
workers in Kim's survey who mistakenly believed that termination without cause was illegal
and demonstrates widespread acceptance of the just cause norm. See id. at 486.
"9 Id. at 494. Confusion can also be perpetuated by employers who breach the norm
by terminating employees arbitrarily and then justify the termination as for cause so the
remaining employees will not be upset by the action. Thus, the employees may not have
realized fellow employees were being fired without cause. Id. at 494-95.
"0 See Kim, supra note 276, at 495-96.
291 See Kupferberg, supra note 17, at 498.
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pectations of continued benefits constitute a norm that workers will
confuse with a formal legal rule. 292
 Professor Kim also cautions that
because norms are highly context specific, her study in the employ-
ment at will context is "too narrow to support any systematic theory of
when and under what conditions such confusion [of law and norms]
will occur."295
 Therefore, it cannot be maintained that continued re-
tiree health benefits are a social norm that courts ought to protect
based solely on Professor Kim's research.294
Parallels between the employment at will context and the subject
of welfare benefits litigation suggest, however, that confusion of a so-
cial norm and formal legal rules may have occurred.295 Because they
are both elements of the employment relationship, it seems unlikely
that workers would so greatly misunderstand employment at will but
have a fully realistic picture of employee benefits. 296 Professor Kim
considers it plausible for workers to confuse norms and law "where
norms are strongly held, widely shared and regularly reinforced by
routine, observable practices."297 As Part I indicated, throughout most
of the unionized workplace's history, employers and employees mutu-
ally accepted the existence of continuing retiree benefits. 298 Even after
Pittsburgh Plate Glass freed employers from any legal requirement to
bargain with unions over retiree health benefits, many continued to
do so because they feared the informal sanctions they might face for
refusing to deal with unions over the issue. 299
Seeing lifetime benefits as a workplace norm explains why it is
reasonable for recent retirees to continue to have expected such
292 One empirical study finds workers have little understanding of their pension plans,
a benefit similar to the welfare benefits at issue here. As might be expected, younger, active
employees have little understanding of these benefits, making it less likely that they have
sufficient information to protect their benefits throughout their careers. See Andrew A.
Luchak & Morley Gunderson, What Do Employees Know About their Pension Plan., 39 hws.
REL. 647, 664 (2000).
295
 Kim, supra note 276, at 493.
294 See id.
295 See infra notes 296-299.
296 See Kim, supra note 276, at 484 (describing similar operation of norms in ILM).
297 Id. at 493-94.
299 See supra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
299 See John Morrell & Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intl Union, AFL-
CIO, 37 F.3d 1302, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1994) (Heaney, J., dissenting). (Employer had a
perfect opportunity ... to unilaterally terminate health benefits for retirees in 1971 when
Pittsburgh Plate Glass was decided by the Supreme Court. It failed to do so and instead con-
tinued to bargain with the Union with respect to retiree health benefits and to honor re-
tirees' health benefit claims without interruption.").
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benefits, despite changes in the environment around them.soo Such
benefits sparked employee expectations of legal rights, despite formal
legal rules allowing employers to terminate benefits unilaterally or a
recent trend suggesting employees should no longer expect such
benefits."' Like workers in Professor Kim's study, retirees who spent
years in a union workplace would have had a strong belief that their
benefits would continue, and, rather than change their long-standing
beliefs in the face of information that challenged them, they likely
discounted the new information as inapplicable to their circum-
stances. 302 Under a theory that retirees' attitudes toward benefits are
similar to mistaken beliefs regarding the protections the law provides
in employment at will situations, one sees that employees would have
continued to believe that they would receive benefits even after the
conditions giving rise to those expectations ceased to exists"
The most important implication of retirees' failure to understand
the vulnerability of benefits is that they would have been unlikely to
take steps to provide for their own retirement health needs. 304
 If they
believed that lifetime health coverage would continue and the lan-
guage of an ambiguous collective bargaining agreement failed to
clearly correct this misunderstanding, workers would have had little
incentive to prepare for the costs that they would face during retire-
ments% Thus, if courts fail to protect their expectations where the
collective bargaining agreement is silent or ambiguous, retirees will
be whipsawed for relying on reasonable expectations that were never
properly dispelled: the employer can terminate retiree benefits and
the retirees, at an advanced age and on a fixed income, must procure
expensive supplemental insurance on their own. 306 Evidence that
workers misunderstand their retiree benefits in the same way they
overestimate their rights in the employment at will context provides
courts with a reasonable and equitable justification for presumuing
the benefits vested: retirees should not be forced to bear the entire
cost of a legitimate misunderstanding regarding the benefits' dura-
tion.507
3°° See Kim, supra note 276, at 493-95.
301 See id. (describing how workers retain norms despite evidence challenging them).
3°3 See id. at 495-96.
3°3 See id.
3°4 See Kim, supra note 276, at 496 (noting employees are unlikely to take action to
solve workplace problems that they do not understand to exist).
305 See Brouwer, supra note 5, at 1000.
506 See Berneking, supra note 5, at 268.
30 See Bidlach, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
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Critics may argue alternatively that even if the context of the un-
ion workplace justifies the subjective expectations of retirees, such
factors cannot demonstrate that employers also shared such expecta-
tions and agreed to provide lifetime benefits. 308 They maintain that
the intent of the employer, of course, can be safely presumed to be
precisely the opposite. 3® When agreements are silent, however, courts
should determine not what the parties may have preferred at the
formation of the agreement, but what they would have agreed to
when the agreement was reached. 310 If the agreement were reached
when continued retiree health benefits still constituted a workplace
norm, the continued benefits should be binding on employers as well,
despite the existence of formal legal rules allowing them to terminate
benefits under some circumstances." Judge Cudahy points out that
even after the Supreme Court ruled that employers could unilaterally
modify benefits in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, employers were not necessar-
ily free to terminate benefits. 312 The expectations of lifetime benefits
were so commonly held that at the formation of these contracts both
the employees and the employers viewed the benefits as vested. 313
Even in the late 1980s, workplaces could still have operated under a
norm of continued retiree benefits. 314 Should empirical research es-
tablish that the expectations were so widely held so as to constitute a
social norm, it is for the employer to make a showing that, in a
specific workplace, those expectations were incorrect and properly
dispelled. 315
Whether courts should protect employee and retiree expecta-
tions of continued benefits also depends upon whether the norms are
self-enforcing. 316 When norms are self-enforcing, the workplace's in-
308 See Weeks, supra note 93, at 496-97,503.
302 Id. at 496-97.
31° See id. at 503.
311
	 Kim, supra note 276, at 484-85.
312 Cudahy points out that the employer in Pittsburgh Plate Glass only wanted to replace
the benefits it was providing to retirees with benefits from Medicare, meaning the overall
level of benefits would remain unchanged. See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 n.4 (Cudahy, J., con-
curring) (citing Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
157 (1971)). The employer never intended to reduce negotiated benefits or to terminate
such benefits. See id.; see also Morrell, 37 F.3d at 1311-12 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing
continuation of benefit belies understanding that benefits were not vested).
313 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
314 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring) (stating trend of continuing benefits extended into
at least mid-1980s); see also supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
313
 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text..
3113 See Rock & Watchter, supra note 285, at 1947.
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formal mechanisms are sufficient to require each side of the employ-
ment relationship to fulfill its obligations, 317 When informal work-
place mechanisms enforcing these social norms fail, the norms will
not be respected.318 In such cases, there is the opportunity for one
side of the relationship to be opportunistic and violate norms that
they would otherwise be expected to uphold. 3" Because the norm is
based on the nature of the ILM and not on the law, nothing prevents
an opportunistic party from violating the norm in the absence of self-
enforcement. 520 If this occurs, it may be necessary for the law to step
in and enforce the norms so that one side does not take advantage of
the other. 321
Arguably, employees' most potent method of self-enforcement of
norms is union action.322 Although unions represent workers in cases
like Yard-Man, a norm of continued benefits still might not be self-
enforcing. 323 Legally, as a result of the holding in Pittsburgh Plate Glass
which made retiree health benefits a permissive subject of bargaining,
unions' ability to discuss proposed changes to these benefits is mini-
mal, and any economic pressure they might bring over the issue is
unprotected.324 Practically, unions may be unable to effectively en-
force the norm of continued benefits where it existed due to their
increasing weakness in American workplaces.325 The decline in retiree
welfare benefits discussed in Part I has closely trailed the decline in
union strength during the last two decades. 326 While a strong union
like the UAW may occasionally be able to enforce a norm of contin-
ued benefits for its retirees through internal mechanisms, such cases
317 See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and
the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953,1957 (1996); see also
Kim, supra note 276, at 503-04.
313 See Kamiat, supra note 317, at 1957.
312 See Rock & Watchter, supra note 285, at 1947.
3" See Kamiat, supra note 317, at 1955.
321 See id. at 1968; see also Kim, supra , note 276, at 498-99 {discussing arguments of
those who reject formal legal rules when, incongruous with social norms). Some critics
reject this point because they fear courts will be too meddlesome and unable to efficiently
enforce the norms, even when norms are not self-enforcing. See Rock & Watchter, supra
note 285, at 1950-51.
322 See Rock & Watchter, supra note 285, at 1947 (advocating unionism as method of
self-enforcement); see also Kandat, supra note 317, at 1969.
223 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
324 See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
325 See Charles G. Bakaly, Jr., A Response to Murphy's Law, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY
91-92 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1985).
"6 See id.
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are the exception.327
 Most unions are unable to expend their limited
resources fighting for retirees when they have an express duty to rep-
resent active employees. 328
 Finally, unions do not have a duty to repre-
sent the interests of retirees. 328
 Lacking such a duty, even a strong,
influential union could easily opt not to enforce the norms of the un-
ionized relationship relating to retirees.338
 For these reasons, norms
obligating employers to provide lifetime benefits may not be self-
enforcing, thus making the courts an appropriate third-party enforcer
of the obligation to prevent employer opportunism. 331
C. Special Considerations Due to the Collective Bargaining Relationship
Because the union bargaining relationship is unique, there are
special considerations for courts considering whether benefits vest. 332
The Yard-Man approach of protecting vulnerable benefits is, in part,
premised on the fact that unions have no duty to protect them in fu-
ture bargaining.333
 As the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass
specificly recognized, the "risk cannot be overlooked that union
representatives on occasion might see fit to bargain for improved
wages or other conditions favoring active employees at the expense of
retirees' benefits."334 Because retirees earned these benefits in the
past by trading away wages for the benefits in the form of deferred
compensation, courts like the Sixth Circuit hold that the retirees
would have expected these benefits to vest because the union would
not protect them.338 The Roth court further noted that because unions
have no duty to represent retirees, a presumption of vesting "serves to
protect the voiceless in the subsequent negotiating process. "936
Moreover, because the parties to the agreement reasonably know that
this expectation would arise, courts must conclude the inclusion of
327
 See Blumenstein, supra note 83, at Al.
$20 See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 1BT Locals Now Electing Convention Delegates, BNA LAB.
REL. REP., Mar. 18, 1996, at d-21 (discussing cash-strapped Teamsters' need to increase
dues to replenish strike fund and finance union operation).
329 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 172-73.
33° See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 473.
331 See Kamiat, supra note 317, at 1967-68.
332
 See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 126; Weeks, supra note 93, at 503.
"3 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
"4
 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 173.
315 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
336 See Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 473.
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benefits in the contract by the parties is evidence of intent for the
benefits to vest.337
Critics of Yard-Man state that because these cases are a matter of
contract under the collective bargaining agreement, retirees already
had the opportunity to protect this delayed compensation and obtain
vested benefits in the negotiation process. 338 For example, the Third
Circuit in Skinner Engine was unpersuaded by the Yard-Man court's rea-
soning that because retirees would not be represented by the union in
future bargaining, the expectation of the benefits should be protected
by vesting.339 It rejected the Yard-Man approach by noting that be-
cause the retirees affected by the employer's reduction of the benefits
were active employees when the collective bargaining agreements in
question were formed, they could have pressured the union to press
for vested rights.30 The fact that they did not indicated that they con-
sciously accepted the stated terms of the contract, and that they
should bear the burden of the choice not to push for the vesting Ian-
guage.341
Considering continued benefits as a social norm of the unionized
workplace addresses this criticism, however. 342 The Skinner Engine
court's argument assumes that retirees considered the possibility that
the benefits could be taken away and consciously chose to not take
steps to protect them.343 If Professor Kim's research demonstrating
the inability of workers to understand their legal rights is applicable to
this element of the employment relationship, the lack of contractual
vesting language cannot be evidence of a conscious acceptance of
terminable benefits. 344 Like workers who misunderstand employers'
duties under employment at will, union employees would not con-
sider it necessary to press their representatives for a clause protecting
benefits that they assumed would continue. 343 Under the norms of the
unionized workplace, the continuation of benefits was understood. 346
The employees would not have sought language to protect something
337 See Yard•Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
333 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 141.
3" See id.
34G See id.
341 See id.
342 See infra notes 343-349.
343 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3(1 at 141.
344 See Kim, sup.ra note 276, at 405-06.
345 See id. at 480.
348 See Bidtack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
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they never anticipated was vulnerable. 347
 Additionally, where the con-
tract was ambiguous about the duration of benefits, the union mem-
bers' misunderstanding may not have been adequately dispelled. 348
Another response to the critics' argument is that it assumes that
while the retirees were active employees they were aware of and
closely monitored the union's bargaining positions. 349 It is more rea-
sonable to suppose that they opted to allow their representatives to
negotiate the technical details of the contract and did not authorize
every move the negotiators made. 35° Because the Third Circuit
adopted a strong presumption that benefits did not vest, it required
the retirees to present clear contract language demonstrating an in-
tent to vest benefits before it would consider evidence extrinsic to the
contract. 351
 Thus, the court never considered extrinsic evidence to
determine if, while they were active employees, the retirees either
consciously consented to language that did not expressly vest the
benefits or that they understood the benefits were not guaranteed for
life. 352
Finally, critics of the Yard-Man approach dispute the validity of
attempts to determine the parties' obligations by looking for an intent
in ambiguous collective bargaining agreements. 353
 They assert that
because a collective bargaining agreement is created within the con-
text of an ongoing relationship, the parties do not negotiate under an
assumption that this will be the last time they will discuss an issue. 354
Therefore, they would never have considered what would happen if
the relationship ended and neither party is likely to express its view
about the duration of retiree benefits at the time. 355
 Thus, the docu-
ment cannot exhibit an intent as to what would happen if this were
the last contract.556
 Considering factors like expectations to determine
intent is wrong because courts can only speculate what the parties
would have agreed upon and will interpret the contract based on
347 See Kim, supra note 276, at 505-06.
348 See Berneking, supra note 5, at 286 (citing Morrell, 37 F.3d at 1313-14 (Heaney, J.
dissenting)).
342 See id.
330 See id. (citing Mon-ell, 37 F.3d at 1313-14 (Heaney, J., dissenting)); see also Luchak &
Gunderson, supra note 292, at 966 (finding workers who are several years away from re-
tirement have little knowledge or understanding of retirement pension benefits).
151 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140-43.
352 See id. at 140.
353 See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 123-24; Weeks, supra note 93, at 502.
354 See Weckstein, supra note 11, at 123-24; Weeks, supra note 93, at 502.
355 Weeks, supra note 93, at 491,493.
356 See id. at 493.
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their own policy orientations. 357 These critics find it likely, therefore,
where the words of the agreement provide no clear guide, any intent
the court deciphers will not be one which was in the minds of the par-
ties, but one constructed by judicial imagination. 358
This lack of discernable intent, while perhaps true, however, only
strengthens the need for courts to look beyond the actual language of
the collective bargaining agreement if it does not unambiguously dic-
tate whether the benefits should vest. 359 If no intent is readily ex-
pressed through the language of the collective bargaining agreement,
courts should attempt to determine what the parties would have
agreed to in the absence of contractual language.36°
Many authorities indicate that it is appropriate for courts to con-
sider expectations when interpreting a collective bargaining agree-
ment because such an approach comports with an accurate view of
the nature of such agreements.361 In United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation, Go., the Supreme Court recognized that collective
bargaining agreements are efforts "to erect a system of industrial self-
government."362 Archibald Cox, one of the foremost experts in
American labor law, described the complexity of collective bargaining
agreements by stating that with the possible exception of the tax code,
"no state or federal statute . . . covers as wide a variety of subjects or
impinges on as many aspects [of the workplace]" as such agree-
ments. 363 Because this complex agreement must be short and simple
enough for the average worker to comprehend, however, it will inevi-
tably be incomplete. 364 Thus, the words of the collective bargaining
agreement cannot constitute the exclusive source of the rights and
duties under the contract. 365 Instead, "the law of the shop" and the
informal rules of the employment relationship that cannot be con-
tained in the express language of the agreement should be consid-
ered to determine what the parties expected. 366 When the document
357 Weckstein, supra note 11, at 127.
353 See id. at 123-24 (citing arbitration opinion by Professor Clyde Summers, Roxbury
Carpet Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CC1-1) I[ 8521, at 4937 (Oct. 26, 1973)).
359 SeeArchibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 14ARV. L. REV. 1482, 1490-93
(1959).
36° See Weeks, supra note 93, at 503.
361 See Zimarowski, supra note 99, at 479; see also Keifer,  872 F.2d at 64.
56z United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
363 See Cox, supra note 359, at 1490.
361 See id.
365 See id. at 1998-99.
366 See Warrior 49' Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 580-81.
1256	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 42:1215
is silent or unclear due to its numerous generalities, deliberate ambi-
guities and gaps, the background of the workplace is used to fill in the
gaps.567
 In Bidlack, Judge Cudahy argued a similar point and noted
that when agreements are silent as to what the parties agreed, the
courts must look to the assumptions that they shared in the "prevail-
ing conventions in the relevant community of discourse. "s68
 Because
norms of the ILM, and expectations based upon them, are an essen-
tial part of the background of the workplace, they are a crucial source
for determining what happens in the event no discernable intent can
be found.568
 By considering these expectations, courts are able to in-
terpret the contract with a more complete view of the bargaining rela-
tionship.=
IV. THE REMAINING CHALLENGE TO AN EXPECTATIONS ANALYSIS: A
VESTING PRESUMPTION AND FEDERAL LABOR POLICY
A. An Inference or Presumption of Vesting
Since creating the "Yard-Man Inference" in UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.,
the Sixth Circuit has insisted that its approach does not presume that
health benefits continue for the retiree's life merely because such
benefits are included in a collective bargaining agreement. 371 Rather,
the court inferred an intent that benefits vest from the existence and
nature of the benefits the union and the employer provided.= The
difference, at least in theory, is crucial. As an "inference," the Yard-
Man approach requires retirees to point to other language in the con-
tract indicating an intent to vest and merely buttresses an otherwise
sufficient attempt to prove the benefits vested. 373 If the Yard-Man ap-
proach is a presumption, however, the court presumes that the
benefits vested and then the employer must disprove that presump-
tion and demonstrate the benefits did not vest.374
 Although each cited
Yard-Man, both the concurrence in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp. and
367 See Cox, supra note 359, at 1493.
363 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 n.3 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (citing Randy E. Barnett,
The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 902 (1992)).
369 See Cox, supra note 359 at 1493.
370 See Keffer, 872 F.2d at 64.
371
 UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).
372 See id.
373 Id.
374 See, e.g., Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy,
J., concurring).
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the Roth v. City of Glendale court created presumptions that took effect
after the plaintiffs demonstrated the agreement was silent or ambigu-
ous regarding the duration of benefits," They presume the benefits
were interminable and require the employer prove by extrinsic evi-
dence that the employees' expectations were incorrect and that the
parties never intended to vest the benefits."
In Yard-Man and subsequent cases, however, the Sixth Circuit has
consistently denied creating such a burden-shifting presumption be-
cause it could not identify a federal labor policy "presumptively favor-
ing interminable rights." 377 Without such a labor policy, the court was
vulnerable to criticisms that it was interpreting collective bargaining
agreements in violation of traditional contract principles without a
clear mandate from Congress." Critics reject shifting the burden to
the employer because it requires a defendant to disprove that it
granted a contractual benefit rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove
such benefits were provided. 379
Despite the Sixth Circuit's insistence that the "Yard-Man Infer-
ence" does not create a presumption, courts and commentators who
both endorse and criticize Yard-Man have labeled the inference a re-
buttable presumption that employers are required to disprove. 389 The
courts in both Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. and UAW v.
Skinner Engine Co. held that such a presumption would undermine
contract law. 381 Even supporters of the Yard-Man approach refer to the
"Yard-Man Inference" as a rebuttable presumption that benefits vest
and that the employer must prove that the benefits were never in-
tended to do so.382
The reason that few courts beyond the Sixth Circuit accept its
distinction between an inference and a presumption is that if one ac-
"5 See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring) (favoring weak vesting presumption); Roth v. City of
Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Wis. 2000) (adopting reasoning in Bidlack concurrence).
Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
577 See Maurer v. joy Tech. Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2000); UAW v. BVR Liqui-
dating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (Gth Cir. 1999); Golden V. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656
(Gth Cir. 1996); Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482; see also Berneking, supra note 5, at 273 (citing
Sixth Circuit caselaw stating inference does not shift burden to employer).
378 See Rogers, supra note 11, at 1070-71.
"9 See id. at 1053 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.1, 3.3 (1982)).
38° See Fisk, supra note 5, at 176 (labeling "Yard-Man Inference" as strong vesting pre-
sumption); Rogers, supra note 11, at 1034. But see Berneking, supra note 5, at 273 (citing
Sixth Circuit caselaw stating inference does not shift burden to employer).
38 ' See UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Ander-
son v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988).
382 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
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cepts that Yard-Man only creates an inference that buttresses other
contractual evidence, it and the expectations mean nothing."' The
opinion states that an inference can only support a showing already
sufficient to prove the retirees' case and that the inference based on
retirees' expectations only allowed for the court's finding that the
benefits had vested because additional_ factors, such as the past prac-
tice of the employer and the lack of specific durational limitations on
welfare benefits, also supported that finding.'" By recognizing the
legitimate expectations that employees had in the bargaining context
and requiring the employer to show that the expectations were incor-
rect, Cudahy's opinion is really a more straightforward means to ac-
complish what the Yard-Man court sought to do with the inference. 585
The interpretation of Yard-Man as truly a presumption is also more
consistent with the way subsequent courts have applied the "Yard-Man
Inference," despite the characterization that the Sixth Circuit has
given to the approach.386
B. Federal Labor Policy
Characterizing the Yard-Man approach as a presumption, how-
ever, should not sound a death knell for attempts to protect worker
expectations of continued benefits. 387 As United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co. established, courts interpreting collective bar-
gaining agreements under section 301 may establish presumptions if
those presumptions are needed to fulfill Congress's labor policies.588
Cases in which the problems lack express statutory sanction will be
resolved by looking to the legislation's policy and fashioning remedies
to effectuate that policy. 389 In other words, before the courts consider
retiree expectations, they must determine whether such an approach
would "denigrate or contradict a federal labor policy." 3" Critics of the
Yard-Man approach assert that there is no federal labor policy sup-
porting a presumption of vesting and that federal labor policy actually
"3 See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
384
 See id. at 1480-81.
383
 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
m6 See Weeks, supra note 93, at 502; see alsoWeckstein, supra note 11, at 127.
587 See infra notes 388-416 and accompanying text.
388 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior Sc Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-78
(1960).
939 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
398 See Yard-Man, 716 E2d at 1480.
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prevents it. 391 They argue that because ERISA does not provide for
vesting of welfare benefits, no federal labor policy could support a
presumption of vesting.592 Additionally, because Congress considered
requiring vesting of welfare benefits but rejected it in 1974, they read
ERISA to bar courts from presuming that retiree benefits vest if the
contract that granted them is ambiguous. 595
This view reads the purposes and policies of ERISA too narrowly
and exaggerates the force of the presumption that courts should ap-
ply.394 When Congress considered welfare benefits in 1974, the situa-
tion was vastly different from today because, at the time, health
benefits for retirees were of relatively little importance and unlikely to
be cut by employers due to their low cost. 895 Pensions, on the other
hand, were a massive expense for employers, and numerous retirees
found their expectations of employer-provided retirement income
disappointed. 396 Because welfare benefits were less expensive and,
therefore, less threatened than pensions, Congress exempted welfare
benefits from ERISA's pension vesting procedures, reflecting its
judgment that, at the time, any threat to continued health benefits
was less significant than the added costs and administrative difficulties
that would be imposed on employers if vesting were mandated. 397
While Congress's main concern at ERISA's passage was the pro-
tection of retirement income through pensions, this does not imply,
however, that Congress did not also intend to protect additional
benefits. 598 As other commentators have noted, ERISA's legislative his-
tory and structure indicate its drafters realized that they could not
anticipate all future issues related to retiree benefits and thus ex-
pected courts would use their power to create federal common law to
further protect what the statute did not 399 One of ERISA's sponsors
stated that claims related to ERISA should be dealt with "in similar
fashion to those brought under Section 301 of the (LMRA).” 400 By
391 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140-41; see also Anderson, 836 F.2d at 1517; Rogers, su-
pra note 11, at 1070-71.
374 See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 140-41.
393  See id.
394 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Fisk, supra note 5, at 166; see
also Berneking, supra note 5, at 285.
395 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (reporting employers' costs for health
cases were relatively tow).
396 Fisk, supra note 5, at 166.
397 Id.
393 See id.
399 See id.; Brouwer, supra note 5, at 988.
400 See Brouwer, supra note 5, at 989.
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granting courts the same power to create federal law under ERISA
that it does under the LMRA, Congress signaled its intention that
courts "safeguard workers against loss of their earned or anticipated
benefits:mei Now that changed conditions threaten the earned and
reasonably anticipated health benefits of retirees, just as pension
plans were threatened in the 1970s, courts should exercise the power
granted to them under section 301 and ERISA to adapt federal law to
these changed circumstances. 402
 The need to protect retirees' reason-
able expectations is a situation Congress sought to provide for when it
gave courts the power to create federal law to fill in ERISA's gaps. 4°3
While courts should not hunt for national labor policies that do not
exist, there is little reason to think an accurate understanding of the
context in which these benefits were provided would not comport
with federal labor policy.'" So long as an interpretation does not
"denigrate or contradict basic principles of federal labor law," it
should be acceptable.405
 Until Congress amends ERISA to protect re-
tiree welfare benefits, courts must do so by using their power to fash-
ion a federal common law that respects reasonable expectations of
retirees.4°6
Moreover, despite the charges of its critics, the presumption sug-
gested here is a minimal protection.407
 First, while critics recite a litany
of evils that will result if courts adopt anything short of a strong pre-
sumption against vesting, including crushing employer liabilities, un-
ion opportunism and skyrocketing health costs, one court has keenly
noted that such predictions assign "an awful lot of weight to a rule
that parties are free to change by contract."408
 Any employer and un-
ion wishing to contract around a weak vesting presumption can easily
do so by drafting an unambiguous contract that ensures benefits do
not vest.40* Second, the presumption only applies after retirees can
401 Fisk, supra note 5, at 169 (quoting ERISA's sponsor, Senator Jacob javits).
4" See id. at 166.
403
 See Id.; see also Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d
275, 281 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding where ERISA is silent, courts must create federal law).
4" See Cox, supra note 359, at 1498-99 (advocating arbitration because consideration
of workplace is necessary to understand collective bargaining agreement).
4°5
 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480.
4°6 See supra note 119 (discussing Emergency Retiree Health Benefit Protection Act).
407 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
408 .See id. at 609.
409 See id. Note that Pittsburgh Plate Glass is premised on both the conflict between the
interests of active union members and retirees and unions' willingness to protect active
workers' wages by sacrificing retiree benefits. See supra note 87. If Pittsburgh Plate Glass is
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prove that the agreement creating the benefits is silent or ambiguous
regarding the duration of benefits. 41° Thus, an unambiguously-
worded agreement stating that benefits terminate at the end of the
expiration of the agreement would be sufficient to inform retirees
that the benefits are not vested. 411 Furthermore, due to the costs of
today's retiree benefits, new labor contracts are unlikely to fail to
clearly define the benefits duration. 412 Thus, the number of cases
where this presumption will be necessary will eventually dwindle.
Finally, because this Note advocates a weak presumption, even if a
court finds the agreement ambiguous, an employer need only pro-
duce evidence that the expectations of the workers were not objec-
tively reasonable.413 The employer could do this by citing the bargain-
ing history of the firm, the absence of a recent trend of secure
benefits or other workplace policies tending to show that that specific
workplace did not exhibit a "strongly held and widely shared" norm
sufficient to generate and support expectations of continued
benefits.414 Based on the recent and current trends in retiree health
benefits, this burden will not be great, but it will be sufficient to pro-
tect those workers whose bargaining environments legitimately con-
tinued to promote a norm of lifetime benefits that has been a com-
mon element of the unionized workplace since its inception. 413
Overall, a weak vesting presumption encourages employers to clearly
and fully define the obligations they owe to their employees so that
future retirees will have adequate notice of their rights and will not be
penalized for their high hopeots
CONCLUSION
While additional research is needed to confirm it, evidence sug-
gests that continued employer-provided retiree benefits has been a
norm of the unionized workplace and, until only recently, workers
correct, it is reasonable to assume that unions would be willing to agree to a contract that
unambiguously allows employers to make unilateral changes to retiree benefits.
410 See id. at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (stating that presumption would apply only if
agreement is silent or ambiguous); Rath, 614 N.W.2d at 972.
411 See Bid lack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
412 See Kupferberg, supra note 17, at 501.
413 See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 613 (Cudahy, J., concurring); Roth, 614 N.W.2d at 472.
414 See Kim, supra note 276, at 493-94 (discussing elements of the workplace setting
that are necessary for norms and laws to be confused).
413 See supra notes 30-68,295-303 and accompanying text.
416 See Kim, supra note 276, at 504-05 (finding evidence that workers' confusion of
norms with legal rules prevents diem from taking action to protect their interests).
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and employers lived under an assumption that this norm should be
respected. Due to the decline in union power, this norm is no longer
self-enforcing for those retirees whose expectations of lifetime
benefits were not dispelled by clear contractual language. Absent
Congressional action protecting these benefits, courts must step in
and enforce these norms to accomplish Congress's goal to "safeguard
workers against loss of their earned or anticipated benefits." A rebut-
table presumption that benefits vest guarantees that retirees who re-
lied upon this norm will not fall victim and that future retirees will be
put on clear notice if their benefits are vulnerable. This presumption
also respects the negotiated language of unambiguous contracts, but
not by ignoring workers' expectations or the context of the unionized
workplace, which are both crucial to accurately understanding am-
biguous collective bargaining agreements. Critics of this presumption
might suggest that it undermines legitimate contracts and twists the
"law" toward a policy preference. Because the approach advocated
here protects the health and security of working-class retirees, such a
narrow view of employer obligations is, perhaps, to be expected.
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